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Abstract 
This paper examines what is still a relatively new phenomenon in the 
literature, the outsourcing / offshoring of high-technology manufacturing and services. 
This has become a concern for both policy makers and academics for two reasons. 
Firstly, policy makers have become concerned that the offshoring of high-technology 
sectors in the West will follow the more labour intensive sectors, and move to lower 
cost locations. Secondly, international business theory has tended to view low costs, 
and high levels of indigenous technological development as being the two main 
drivers of location advantage in the attraction of FDI. We show that this may not be 
the case for offshored high-technology manufacturing or services.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years a major concern of policy makers has been the extent to which 
globalisation has led to an increase in inequality. Initially this concerned the extent to 
which import competition from low cost countries was leading to a reduction in 
unskilled manufacturing jobs in the West. This was then overlaid with a debate 
concerning the globalisation of technology, and the extent to which technology would 
replace low skilled workers. Following on from this, has been the more recent 
concerns relating to international offshoring / outsourcing of activities, and the 
exporting of jobs from Europe and North America, to locations such as India, China 
or other parts of Asia. This issue has received a good deal of attention in the UK and 
US, but also in the rest of Europe. The debate in Germany for example has focussed 
on the negative effects of outsourcing and offshoring. The question of whether 
German MNEs relocate activities abroad at the detriment of activities at home is an 
important political issue and high on the policy agenda (Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology, 2007). Indeed, in the US, there was a considerable 
debate, conducted largely in the press between two leading economists, Gregory 
Mankiw (2004), who argued that offshoring was merely the latest manifestation of the 
long run gains from trade, and Alan Blinder, who argued that the long term 
ramifications of this, especially in terms of the potential paradigm shift in western 
manufacturing was only beginning to be understood2. There is a potentially even more 
pressing concern, that economies such as the UK, which have become very service 
sector driven, are now experiencing increasing share of services being offshored. This 
represents a significant share of employment and GDP raises new social and political 
concerns. 
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Both policy makers and IB scholars have recently become vexed by this issue. 
The concern for policy makers is clear, not only high-tech outsourcing / offshoring 
may lead to a reduction in employment, output and earnings, but it may also lead to 
key technological developments being made abroad rather than at home. While the 
West has witnessed high levels of competition from low cost locations, both in terms 
of international outsourcing through trade, and of offshoring through FDI, this has 
largely been in low-tech sectors, or in low value added activities in the more high-tech 
sectors. Driffield and Chiang (2009) for example highlight the huge reduction in 
Taiwanese employment that has occurred in low tech sectors as a result of offshoring 
from Taiwan to China.  Couke and Sleuwaegen (2008) however offer a wider context. 
They demonstrate that offshoring is a defensive strategy, used by firms to counter the 
competitive effects of globalisation. This is essentially an extension of the efficiency 
seeking argument for offshoring, and Couke and Sleuwaegen (2008) argue that 
offshoring significantly reduces the probability of exit by Belgian firms. Couke and 
Sleuwaegen (2008) briefly discuss how offshoring can be seen as a an “offensive” 
strategy, but they do not distinguish between high tech and low tech activities. An 
issue for future research is to explore whether this conventional analysis of offshoring 
in terms of high tech firms or sectors. Key questions concern the drivers of offshoring, 
and what the limiting factors may be. Offshoring increasingly involves new product 
development, R&D activities and new product design (Patel and Vega, 1999). This 
phenomenon also presents a new set of problems for IB scholars. Empirical work in 
this area has used relatively simple measures such as labour costs or revealed 
competitive advantage based on trade flows as measures of a more complex set of 
phenomena that tend to be labelled as location advantage (Dunning 1998). It is 
generally assumed that these factors will unambiguously attract FDI, irrespective of 
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the specific motivation for the investment. However, it may be that for outsourcing / 
offshoring of more high-tech activities, other effects dominate.  
The outsourcing / offshoring literature stresses the dominance of location in 
explaining the offshoring decision. However, for high-tech firms, firm specific 
knowledge or ownership advantages may dominate. A key issue for example is the 
ability to manage core technology across national boundaries, and, following Casson 
(2007) limit the leakage or spillover of technology to local firms. Spillovers from FDI 
may not be a central issue for a firm engaging in FDI in the traditional Vernon (1966) 
model, but it is crucial for firms considering the offshoring of high-technology. 
Equally, in this context, while one could envisage that a location minimum threshold 
of technological capacity is desirable, it may be that very high levels of indigenous 
technology may facilitate spillovers, thus discouraging offshoring investment. It is 
beyond the purpose of this paper to discuss the spillovers mechanisms in detail, as 
there are a number of survey papers, see for example Görg and Greenaway (2004), 
who list the main sources as: Formal technology exchange, mobility of employees 
between inward investors and domestic firms, assimilation of technology through 
supply chains, and more informal learning processes. While the MNE may be able to 
prevent the more formal of these, it is clear that the informal mechanisms are strongly 
related to the absorptive capacity of firms, see for example Girma (2005). 
 The purpose of this paper therefore is to discuss the recent outward 
FDI expansion from two angles. Firstly, we analyse the situation that has developed 
over the past ten years in advanced OECD countries, and secondly we provide some 
considerations on changes that may occur in the future. This is important, not only for 
policy makers at a national and regional level, but also for the future of IB theory. By 
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exploring the recent FDI activities of firms from the advanced OECD countries, we 
make several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, this paper provides firm-
level descriptive evidence on the location and activities of offshore investments using 
a panel of MNEs based in eight leading OECD countries and their foreign subsidiaries 
around the world between 1997 and 2006. Secondly, in line with the theoretical 
literature this study highlights the differences between low versus high cost 
destinations and the type of investment undertaken. This is a unique feature of our 
data set in that it allows us to link a parent firm’s domestic operations with its 
subsidiaries across the world including whether the investment is of a horizontal or 
vertical nature. 
Thirdly, the focus of the analysis will be on the high-tech sectors of the 
economy, which play an important role in terms of growth potential for any advanced 
economy, but have yet been unexplored in terms of offshoring or international 
outsourcing. It is thus imperative from an OECD perspective to see whether outward 
FDI from high-tech sectors is occurring at the detriment of home activities and the 
possible erosion of the skill base at home.  
Finally, most of the previous studies focus on the manufacturing sector, either 
on aggregate or at the firm level3. However, the services sector includes knowledge-
intensive industries which play an ever more important role in the structure and 
volume of outward FDI in advanced economies. To this end, this study contributes 
further by incorporating the high-tech service sector in the analysis.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of 
the arguments in previous empirical studies on the determinants of offshoring. Section 
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3 offers a description on how the data set is constructed and descriptive statistics, 
followed by the discussion of the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Previous Analysis 
Theoretical perspectives on outsourcing, be it international or domestic are 
relatively straightforward. The fundamental basis is cost differences between 
producing an intermediate input internally, or purchasing it. Overlaid on that are the 
standard theoretical perspectives of agency theory and transaction cost analysis (see 
for instance, Antràs and Helpman, 2004). This is discussed in detail in Olsen (2006), 
though this literature largely ignores one of the fundamental determinants of 
transaction costs, risk. While agency theory can offer a perspective on the problems 
with managing arm’s length contracts, the risks associated with international 
outsourcing may outweigh the benefits, especially in high-tech sectors where firm 
specific knowledge, whether patented or even uncodified is at a premium (Sanna-
Randaccio and Veugelers, 2007) . 
Theoretical perspectives on offshoring however must build on this. Görg and 
Hanley (2005) present an empirical analysis of the productivity impacts of offshoring, 
while Driffield et al. (2009) illustrate how offshoring FDI may be identified within a 
more general framework, and in turn linked to productivity and labour demand. 
However, all of this analysis is largely empirical, with little theoretical input beyond 
cost differences between locations. It is perhaps surprising that IB theory is not 
applied here more rigorously. For instance, the limits to internalisation are important 
within the context of offshoring. While it may well be the case that cost differences 
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are significant between home and potential host country, the risks associated with 
attempting to manage technology across national boundaries, while preventing 
spillovers, may dictate that offshoring in high-tech sectors is limited. One can link this 
to the standard analysis of FDI within high-tech sectors that sees the MNE as an 
important vehicle for international technology transfer.  
There is a well established literature in international business / technology 
management that has recognised that many of the world’s largest firms carry out R&D 
outside of their home country, but this typically is linked to ideas surrounding 
agglomeration of technological effort, or on the use of FDI in technology sourcing, 
such as the use of offshore facilities as “listening posts” (Budhwar et al., 2006; 
Almeida, 1996; Håkanson and Nobel, 1993; Pearce, 1999; Cantwell and Janne, 1999). 
This analysis however is based on the supposition that these FDI flows are essentially 
between developed countries, typically either transatlantic, or intra EU investments. 
Also, the analysis is largely based on the “triad” model of international production, 
with the US, the richest western European countries, and Japan dominating 
international production, and merely outsourcing or offshoring low level activities to 
neighbouring low wage countries. 
The picture now however is far removed from this. Many high-tech firms from 
these locations are relocating both R&D and R&D related activities to South and 
South East Asia, and to Eastern Europe (e.g., Budhwar et al., 2006). Equally, there is 
a high level of intra-EU FDI in high-tech sectors, which traditionally may have been 
thought of in the context of technology sourcing, but may actually be offshoring that 
has been hitherto ignored. In this paper we aim to explain these differences between 
firms, as well as between countries and industries. As Olsen (2006) highlights, there is 
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very little understanding of what the effects of outsourcing may be. Where analysis is 
carried out, see for example Driffield et al. (2009) or Marin (2006) the focus is on the 
impact of the outsourcing that is observed at a given point in time, rather than on the 
theoretical explanations of it, and what we can learn going forward. Hijzen et al. 
(2005) for example highlight the importance for outsourcing in terms of domestic 
labour demand, but explain this merely in terms of cost differences in the supply of 
intermediate inputs. It should also be pointed out that this literature is based on 
international outsourcing (i.e. purchasing inputs from abroad instead of at home) 
rather than explaining the location of outward FDI in this context.  
However, theoretically, the limiting factor in offshoring high-tech activities is 
not the cost difference. It is well established that countries such as India, China, 
Hungary or the Czech Republic have highly skilled workforces that can undertake 
high value added activities at a lower cost than Japan, Germany or the US. Neither in 
many cases is it the cultural or physical distance between the home and potential host 
country. Rather, it is the agency problem and risk associated with transferring key 
firm specific assets or technology to other countries. It is well understood in the 
literature that such cases generate the greatest spillovers for domestic firms, and is 
contrary to the interests of the parent. This builds on the theory of international 
technology transfer, and the more applied spillovers literature, that highlights high-
tech FDI to countries with sufficient absorptive capacity, as being those projects that 
generate the greatest technology transfer and spillover effects for the host. In some 
cases it may be optimal for a firm to engage in this form of FDI, where they are 
seeking, a la Dunning (1979) or Vernon (1966) to exploit assets or technology in new 
markets. Long standing analysis suggests that such projects are most successful where 
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these investments become embedded in the local production system (see for example 
Caves, 1985) and that in such cases the benefits to the host country are maximised. 
This is a very different scenario for outsourcing or offshoring high-tech 
activities, where the aim is to retain control of the technology, and limit spillovers. 
Casson (2007) discusses this in some detail, highlighting the desire of firms to 
minimise spillovers rather than limit them. 
3. Analysis 
3.1 The data. 
Table 1 lists the countries and industries in our sample. The focus in this paper 
is on firms from the most advanced OECD countries which operate in high-
technology industries. A feature of “high-tech” industries is that they possess high 
levels of identifiable technology in the form of R&D and tacit knowledge which is 
intangible in nature. Such industries are seen as engines for growth in any economy 
and thus the threat of relocation of employment from high-tech industries makes this a 
highly sensitive issue, both in a political and economic sense. 
Our data is taken from Orbis, a rich firm-level dataset, provided by Bureau 
van Dijk, which is an electronic publishing and consultancy firm. A growing number 
of researchers have used this data set in recent years to analyse various economic 
issues, including Helpman et al. (2004), Budd et al. (2005) and Konings and Murphy 
(2006). It offers detailed financial and other operational information on private and 
public companies around the world. The data set covers the period 1997-2006, 
including a total of 5,169 OECD MNEs, of which 2,594 are manufacturing firms and 
2,575 are services firms. These MNEs have a network of 9,055 subsidiaries located 
across the world. 
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<Table 1 here> 
Table 2 shows the distribution of parent firms and their subsidiaries across the 
various countries and regions. The United States, France, Germany and the UK 
combined host 75.9 per cent of the parent firms in the sample. While Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Japan each host from 3.3 to 8.5 per cent of the parent firms. 
With regards to the subsidiaries, the EU-15 region holds the majority of subsidiaries 
at 67 per cent followed by North America and Eastern Europe at 13.6 and 6.4 per 
cent, respectively. Locations least attractive are Latin America, Asia, Africa, the 
Middle East and Oceania, ranging from 0.4 per cent to 5.7 per cent of all subsidiaries. 
The lower panel of table 2 illustrates the sector distribution of parent and 
subsidiary firms across the manufacturing and services sectors. Of all manufacturing 
firms in the sample, Germany, France, UK and the US host the majority of parent 
firms (76 per cent) which is followed by the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium and 
Japan. In terms of service firms, parent firms are mostly located in Germany, UK, 
France and the US.  
With regards to the distribution of subsidiaries, the majority is located in the 
EU and North America. The EU-15 and Other Europe (i.e. Switzerland and Norway) 
have a lower percentage of manufacturing parent firms compared with service parent 
firms whereas for the other regions the opposite is true. On the bottom of the table, 
one can see that around a third (23.4 per cent) of the manufacturing parent firms have 
subsidiaries in only the manufacturing sector, 40.6 per cent in only the services sector 
and 36 per cent have subsidiaries in both the manufacturing and services sector.  The 
majority of services parent firms have their subsidiaries in the services sector only, 4.2 
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per cent in the manufacturing sector only and a 26.9 per cent in both the 
manufacturing and services sector. 
<Table 2 here> 
Table 3 shows the distribution of parent firms and their investment location by 
firm size. Across the five size bands, the location choice of MNEs is fairly consistent. 
Most investments are undertaken within the EU-15 and North America (at least 85 per 
cent). Again, a significant portion of investment is attracted to Eastern Europe, 
especially in the manufacturing sector. For the service sector, Eastern Europe and 
other Europe (i.e. Norway and Switzerland) seem to be equally attractive. 
Interestingly, distance does seem to play an important part for smaller MNEs which 
have lower shares of their investments in far-away destinations, such as Latin 
America, Asia, Africa and Oceania. 
<Table 3 here> 
3.2 Initial Discussion 
Figure 1 shows the average annual growth rates of workers employed by the 
parent firm and their subsidiaries in various regions of the world for the period 1997-
2006. Albeit considerable heterogeneity, the figure shows that the rate of growth was 
increasing up until 2000. It then fell for two years before increasing again more 
moderately until 2004 and since then it has been fairly constant. High-tech parent 
firms grew on average at around 15 per cent annually at the beginning of the period 
which fell to around 5 per cent in latter years of the sample period. On a regional 
level, we can see that subsidiaries in Eastern Europe had the highest rates of growth 
throughout most of the period. The most volatile regions in terms of employment 
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growth were other developing countries, which include Asian countries, Africa, Latin 
America and the Middle East. The other regions, namely EU-15, North America and 
other developed countries within the OECD show a relatively more modest trend 
which is in the figure lies between that of Eastern Europe and other developing 
countries. 
<Figure 1 here> 
Table 4 shows the average growth rate of workers employed over the sample period. 
For parent firms in the manufacturing sector, this ranges from 0.6 per cent in Japan to 
5.9 per cent in Belgium. However, the growth rates are significantly higher for parent 
firms in the services sector, ranging from 11.1 per cent in Japan to 26.9 per cent in 
Belgium. In terms of the growth rates of subsidiaries, higher rates are observed among 
subsidiaries mainly in developing countries. For example, subsidiaries in Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and Asia have grown up to a maximum of 35 per cent. Much 
smaller rates of growth are to be found in subsidiaries located in Africa, the Middle 
East and Oceania. Subsidiaries located in the EU-15 and North America have also 
more modest growth rates but nowhere near the ones in some developing countries. 
In comparison to the above results, table 5 also shows average growth rates for 
parents in the low-tech sectors of OECD countries, together with their subsidiaries 
around the world. The main difference is that the growth rates of employment are not 
as heterogeneous. For example, both for manufacturing and services, parent and 
subsidiary growth rates are not as volatile across countries as for the high-tech sector. 
One reason might be, that the sample of industries regarded as low-tech is larger than 
for the high-tech sector, thus having a larger set of subsidiaries as well. This has the 
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effect that a number of big investments in the high-tech industry in say Eastern 
Europe in any one year might have a bigger effect on the growth rates for that region. 
Nevertheless, what is consistent across both sectors is that the employment rates of 
growth are higher in some developing regions, such as Eastern Europe. 
<Tables 4 and 5 here> 
3.3 Econometric analysis of the probability to offshore high-tech 
activities 
Finally, we extend the descriptive and bivariate analysis by examining the 
propensity to engage in offshoring by estimating the following model: 
ittiit
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     (1) 
where Offshore represents the decision of a high-tech firm to engage in 
offshoring, that is engaging in FDI in upstream sectors to low cost locations. Equation 
(1) is derived from the literature discussed above, and includes the following 
variables: 
Firm size is a measure of the firms’ ability to manage diverse and complex 
assets, measured in terms of employment. Productivity4 represents the standard 
measure of the internal efficiency of the firm. Profitability (defined as Earnings before 
Interest and Taxes) is a measure of the financial well being of the firm. Capital 
intensity is measured as total assets / turnover, and is employed as the standard 
measure of firm specific assets or knowledge. Finally, cash flow is included, as a 
measure of the ability of the firm to fund new investments (Baker et al. 2003). The 
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potential importance of cash in explaining offshoring highlights one of the differences 
between this type of FDI, and the more researched market seeking or technology 
exploiting FDI, that typically is funded by equity, or commonly in recent years, debt. 
This is also a pointer to the future flows of different types of FDI, with debt more 
difficult to obtain and service since the onset of the credit crunch.  
The general outsourcing / offshoring literature suggests that firm size is 
expected to be positive, while the effects of labour productivity and firm performance 
are rather more ambiguous. In general, these variables are positively associated with 
the ability of a firm to undertake outward FDI5. However, the outsourcing / offshoring 
literature that examines the propensity of firms in low-technology sectors to relocate 
to low cost locations suggests that these variables will be negative, suggesting the low 
performance firms are those with the greatest cost pressure, and most likely to 
relocate. However, this is less likely to be the case for high-technology firms, where 
the ability to manage high productivity capacity across national boundaries may be 
more important. As such, it is likely to be the better performing firms that engage in 
offshoring activities. Capital intensity is also expected to be positive, indicative of the 
quality of the firm specific assets, with again better firms looking to engage in 
outsourcing / offshoring.   
In the sector specific regressions, we include a measure of labour costs as an 
additional variable, to capture whether firms from high cost countries are more likely 
to engage in outsourcing / offshoring.  
We estimate this model for a set of eight countries, both jointly and separately. 
The choice of advanced OECD countries was determined according to the availability 
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of sufficient number of parent and subsidiary matches and which included the 
appropriate set of variables used in the analysis.  
3.4 Results 
Moving from the informative, but relatively simple bivariate analysis, we now 
move to a model of offshoring activity in high-tech sectors, building on analysis of 
Girma and Görg (2004), Marin (2006) and Görg et al. (2008). The fundamental 
premise of this is that one can explain the offshoring decision in terms of a few key 
variables, linked to internal and external efficiency (productivity and profitability), 
firm size, the availability of funds to finance the investment, capital intensity, and 
firm specific knowledge.  
Table 6 shows estimates of a selection model represented by equation (1) 
where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable between firms that offshore 
and firms that do not. The appropriate way to estimate this is through a panel probit 
model. This approach is now relatively common in the modelling of the FDI decision; 
see for example Paul and Wooster (2008) for a recent example. The advantages of the 
panel nature of the data are two fold. Firstly, the probit model, as is well understood, 
controls for the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, and secondly the panel 
structure of the data controls for firm-specific and time invariant unobserved factors 
that might influence the decision to invest overseas using firm-specific fixed effects. 
Finally in order to mitigate endogeneity problems of the explanatory variables, we lag 
them by one time period such that, for example, the profits in period t-1 affect the 
firm’s decision to offshore in period t.  
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The first thing to note about the results presented in table 6 is that the models 
are remarkably consistent across all countries. Capital intensity, size and productivity 
are all uniformly associated with an increase in offshoring, with the exception of size 
for the UK. Profitability is either positive or insignificant in all cases, and cash flow is 
either positive or insignificant in all cases with the exception of Germany. Germany is 
of course unique among these countries in that it has a potential low cost location 
within its borders, the East of the country still having significantly lower labour costs 
than the West. 
The results are supportive of our basic hypothesis. Firm performance, 
particularly internal performance measured through productivity is positively 
associated with offshoring in high-technology sectors. This suggests that the better 
performing firms are driven to engage in offshoring of high-technology activities. 
This differs significantly from the findings of studies on low-tech sectors which 
suggest that often firms experiencing low productivity at home seek to offshore 
unproductive activities.  
Taken together, cost seems to be a very minor consideration for outsourcing / 
offshoring in high-tech sectors, compared with the ability to manage assets, and 
develop firms’ specific knowledge. The descriptive results presented in table 2 and 
table 3 indicate that Western Europe and the US were the largest recipients of 
offshore investment in our sample of high-tech MNEs. In addition, the findings 
presented in table 6 and 7 suggest that firm’s specific assets, such as the efficiency 
and ability to manage diverse and complex assets, are key in determining the decision 
to offshore. 
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<Tables 6 and 7 here> 
4. Implications for the Futures of offshoring FDI 
The issue of offshoring / outsourcing  has attracted the attention of policy 
makers in both host and source countries. A speech on “unlocking Europe’s growth 
potential” by the president of the European Commission in 2006 focussed on the 
location, and re-location of activity as the biggest single challenge facing Europe. In 
the US, the Senate recently passed a bill to impose curbs on federally-funded 
outsourcing, with the new US President backing this call. In response, the Indian 
Prime Minister claimed that exporting jobs from the West to India will eventually 
create more employment in economies like the US. All of this highlights the 
importance for local, national and international development of location decisions of 
firms, and FDI flows more generally. It is clear that emerging and transition countries 
are still seeking to attract offshoring FDI, though there are numerous reasons to 
believe that it may have peaked. 
One of the most influential papers in IB in the last ten years is Dunning 
(1998), which highlights the importance of location in explaining, not only the 
strategic decisions of firms at the top of the supply chain, but also where to locate 
other links in the chain. This, allied with a stronger theoretical focus on outsourcing 
has dramatically changed the lens through which the eclectic paradigm is viewed, 
from being one focussing on ownership advantages and international technology 
transfer, to a more balanced assessment of location. In terms of the competitiveness of 
national economies, this theoretical perspective raises additional concerns. While the 
outsourcing or offshoring of low skill activities raises concerns about inequality, 
social immobility and unemployment, the prospect of the outsourcing of more high 
value added activities raises concerns about long term productivity growth and 
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national competitiveness. Theoretically, the same forces that drive the relocation of 
unskilled activity to low cost regions, drive high-tech activities away from high cost 
regions such as the south east of England, southern Germany or the Eastern States of 
the US, to Eastern Europe, China or India. Equally, the restrictions on this placed by 
distance, in terms of outsourcing from the US to China, for example, do not occur in 
terms of Western Europe to say the EU accession countries. 
The limited evidence on the link between outward FDI and firm performance, 
or the work of Couke and Sleuwaegen (2008) however suggests that, contrary to 
popular opinion, offshoring may generally be beneficial (or at least not detrimental) to 
productivity and employment within firms operating in advanced OECD countries 
(Barba Navaretti and Venebles, 2004). Although the dynamic processes by which firm 
performance is enhanced are complex and can take a number of forms, empirical 
results indicate that offshoring can on average be a source of productivity and 
employment growth.  
 
The pattern of offshoring is not a simple story of just giant MNEs relocating a 
large number of jobs to low-wage countries at the detriment of home workers left 
unemployed. Rather, the vast majority of outward FDI is located in other advanced 
OECD countries by SMEs as well as giant MNEs. It is important to note that a whole 
variety of factors are taken into account by international firms in search for greater 
efficiency and growth. In this regard, relative wages are surely a determinant but not 
the key driver of all types of long term investment decisions. Costs interact with 
factors such as infrastructure (social, economic and political, skills mix of workers) 
and the type of investment (horizontal or vertical) to be offshored among many others. 
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The general assumption in the offshoring / outsourcing literature is that it will 
continue unabated, at least in terms of the pressures for the relocation of low cost 
activities. This literature fails to make several key distinctions. Firstly, transport costs 
continue to rise, and the security problems of transporting goods through the Indian 
ocean appear to be increasing. Secondly, there is evidence at the time of writing that 
support for western firms in the form of grants or beneficial loans are being linked to 
employment retention at home, and in some cases even to retrenchment. As such, it is 
possible that the pressures for continued outsourcing may decline.  
This however potentially contrasts with the service sector. Much of the 
offshoring / outsourcing in the service sector requires much less transporting of goods, 
but services that can be transferred electronically. As such, the analysis presented here 
would suggest that this is likely to become more attractive as long as the host 
countries have developed modern and reliable IT infrastructures. However, it is also 
clear that there are limits to this, not just in terms of IPR protection, but also the extent 
to which services such as accountancy or law can easily be traded across borders with 
different regulatory or institutional regimes.  
There is a further potential limit on the scale of offshoring FDI in the near 
future, and that applies to all forms of FDI. Increasingly over the past twenty years, 
more and more FDI has been financed by debt. Since the economic downturn of 2008, 
debt has been more expensive, and harder to obtain. As a result, FDI is starting to 
decline. While FDI associated with offshoring may be more likely than other forms of 
FDI in a recession, financing of new investment is less likely, irrespective of the 
motive. 
Overall, the prospects for continued growth in offshoring, and in particular the 
continued expansion of the range of activities undertaken in such locations may not be 
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as strong as has hitherto been anticipated. The rationale for this is derived from both 
theoretical and empirical analysis of offshoring / outsourcing. In the first instance, the 
transactions costs associated with offshoring / outsourcing high-tech activities may 
preclude this from developing, while the economic downturn may reduce the scope 
for firms to engage in FDI at the same rates as historically been the case.  
5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to examine a phenomenon that, despite some well 
rehearsed examples is relatively uncommon at present. While much of the analysis 
applied to outsourcing / offshoring in general, or in low technology sectors still holds 
true, our study highlights several differences. Firstly, while costs are important, and 
firms from higher cost locations are more likely to engage in offshoring, they in no 
way dominate other considerations. There is a good deal of evidence that suggest that 
the better performing firms, in terms of both productivity and profitability are more 
likely to engage in this form of offshoring, and that while cost does partly explain this, 
there are other factors that may be more important than costs. Equally, larger firms, 
and firms with high levels of capital intensity are also more likely to engage in 
offshoring in high-technology sectors. These results, taken together, suggest that it is 
the ability to manage technology flows across countries that is the largest key 
determinant of offshoring by high-technology firms. Equally, they fund this activity 
through cash flow and profits.  
The major policy concern for the source country with this type of FDI, is that 
key assets or technology are being moved to lower cost locations. This is essentially 
an extension to the arguments that have been made with respect to low cost activities 
being moved abroad. In this case the major concern is increasing unemployment 
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amongst unskilled workers in richer countries. This concern has been exacerbated by 
the so called “hollowing out” phenomenon in Japan, where large sections of very long 
and complex supply chains have relocated from Japan to other parts of Asia. 
A valid question therefore is the extent to which outsourcing / offshoring in 
high-tech activities is merely the next stage in globalisation of production, with the 
technological base of the richest countries under threat, as well as the well paid jobs 
of skilled workers. However, these results suggest that the scale of this phenomenon, 
for the moment at least is rather limited. Firstly, costs are not a driving factor in this 
type of FDI, compared with say the ability of a firm to manage its technology. There 
are clearly risks attached to offshoring high-technology sectors, the greatest of which 
are spillovers or technology transfer to local firms.  
These results would also suggest that from the perspective of the host country, 
the protection of property rights and shareholders returns are important in attracting 
high-tech activities as well as the extent to which adequate IT infrastructures are in 
place. Institutions and governance designed to protect property rights are likely to 
prevent unintended technology transfer or spillovers to the domestic sector, which 
would be a major concern in these sectors. Extending this, as low cost locations 
improve their indigenous technological base, they may become less attractive 
locations for offshored high-technology activities. There is a large literature that 
shows how absorptive capacity plays a crucial role in determining the scale and scope 
of spillovers from FDI, and as absorptive capacity in host countries improve, so does 
the possibility of technology leaking out to local firms. 
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These findings have several implications for the future of IB theory. Firstly, 
that institutions are likely to matter in many more ways than is currently understood. 
IB has recognised that good governance at the firm level is important in the post 
Enron world, and equally that the protection of property rights is important for 
attracting inward investment. However, most conceptual frameworks, developed from 
the investment cycle theory for example, assume that as a country becomes more 
technologically advanced, it will attract more technologically advanced FDI. While 
this study does not completely refute this, it does highlight several limits to the 
process, in terms of intellectual property rights, and the extent to which these allow 
firms to manage core technology across national boundaries.  
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Table 1  Sample of Countries and Industries 
Country High-technology Industry 
Manufacturing 
Pharmaceuticals 
Office machinery and computers 
Radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 
Aircraft and Aerospace 
Service sector 
Telecommunications  
Computer and related activities  
 
 
Belgium 
Germany 
France 
Sweden 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Japan 
 
Research and Development  
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Table 2 Distribution of MNEs and Subsidiaries by Country and Sector (in %) 
Parent firms Frequency Subsidiaries Frequency 
Belgium 5.5 EU 15 67.1 
Germany 15.9 Other Europe 3.5 
France 11.6 Eastern Europe 6.4 
Sweden 6.8 North America 13.6 
Netherlands 8.5 Latin America 5.7 
United Kingdom 14.8 Asia 2.3 
United States 33.6 Africa & Middle East 1 
Japan 3.3 Oceania 0.4 
Total 100  100 
Sector distribution of parent and subsidiary firms 
Parent firms Manu’ Services Subsidiaries Manu’ Services 
Belgium 6.2 4.9 EU 15 50.0 71.4 
Germany 18.5 13.4 Other Europe 2.9 3.9 
France 13.7 9.5 Eastern Europe 8.6 6.0 
Sweden 5.1 8.5 North America 20.5 12.2 
Netherlands 7.5 9.6 Latin America 12.0 4.1 
United Kingdom 10.8 18.8 Asia 3.9 1.8 
United States 33.3 34.0 Africa & Middle East 1.4 0.4 
Japan 4.9 1.3 Oceania 0.7 0.2 
Total 100 100  100 100 
Parent Subsidiary 
 Manufacturing Services Both 
Manufacturing 23.4 40.6 36.0 
Services 4.2 68.9 26.9 
Note: Manu’ –manufacturing. Other Europe = Norway and Switzerland. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Orbis database. 
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Table 3 Distribution of MNEs and their investment locations by Firm Size (in %) 
 High-tech Manufacturing 
 
EU-15 Other Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
North 
America 
Latin 
America Asia 
Africa & 
Middle 
East 
Oceania 
No of  
Employees 
 
       
<25 75.6 6.2 12.4 14.9 7.4 2.9 0.4 0.0 
25-49 77.3 1.9 7.7 17.9 4.8 1.4 0.5 0.0 
50-99 75.4 2.7 8.8 19.9 3.4 2.0 1.3 0.3 
100-249                   71.1 2.8 9.3 27.4 6.4 3.8 0.8 0.2 
>250                   68.9 8.2 12.5 35.3 7.2 8.7 2.8 0.8 
 High-tech Services 
No of  
Employees 
        
<25 77.1 7.9 7.9 9.4 2.5 0.5 0.2 0.5 
25-49 80.3 5.9 3.9 13.4 1.3 1.6 0.0 0.0 
50-99 82.6 6.9 6.0 14.7 0.6 1.2 0.3 0.6 
100-249                   84.5 3.6 3.4 17.5 2.8 2.1 0.5 0.0 
>250                   78.4 7.3 5.5 22.1 9.5 3.0 1.5 0.8 
Source: Authors’ calculation using the Orbis data 
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Source: Authors’ calculation using the Orbis data 
 
 
Figure 1:  Growth rate of Employment 
Annual average (1997-2006)
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 Table 4 Average Labour Growth Rate (% over the period 1997-2006) 
High-tech Manufacturing 
 
Belgium France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK Japan United States 
Parent 5.9 3.5 3.4 2.8 5.9 0.9 0.6 4.6 
 
Subsidiaries 4.1 7.1 7.4 6.3 6.7 8.6 7.5 5.0 
Of which in  
EU 15 1.5 6.0 4.9 6.1 2.6 9.0 6.8 6.0 
Other Europe -- 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.9 5.9 -- 4.4 
Eastern Europe 35.1 12.3 28.6 9.5 21.5 -3.7 -- 8.2 
North America 5.3 12.8 4.7 2.5 5.5 11.0 9.1 2.2 
Latin America -- 7.2 10.4 -3.1 -- -- 6.8 0.1 
Asia 28.6 -4.6 -- 0.0 3.4 -- 12.8 3.4 
Africa & M.E. -- 0.0 1.7 -4.7 -- -- -- -- 
Oceania -- 6.0 -- -- -- 0.1 3.8 -- 
 High-tech Services 
Parent 26.9 16.7 11.9 15.5 22.2 18.5 11.1 15.6 
 
Subsidiaries 8.1 12.9 11.3 16.2 15.1 10.0 6.8 11.6 
Of which in  
EU 15 6.7 9.2 7.5 17.6 16.1 10.0 10.2 12.6 
Other Europe 4.8 -- 9.8 0.4 12.0 -0.8 -- 0.5 
Eastern Europe 3.5 28.8 24.7 23.0 18.7 13.8 -- 20.4 
North America -- 9.2 15.0 -- 50.9 14.8 -- 7.4 
Latin America -- -- -- -- -8.9 2.9 -- -0.6 
Asia -- -- -- -- -- 13.8 -- 33.8 
Africa & M.E. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Oceania 2.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 13.1 
Note: Some parent firm do not have a presence in certain regions or subsidiaries with observation of only 1 year, thus --. 
Source: Authors’ calculation using the Orbis data 
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Table 5 Average Labour Growth Rate over the period 1997-2006 
(Parent firms in Low-tech industries) 
 High-tech Manufacturing 
 
Belgium France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK Japan United States 
Parent 4.4 2.2 1.6 4.3 4.7 2.1 1.1 4.5 
 
Subsidiaries 4.9 6.7 7.5 5.6 4.8 5.6 6.6 4.0 
Of which in  
EU 15 3.7 5.8 5.6 5.0 3.6 4.6 5.8 3.7 
Other Europe 2.8 2.4 3.0 2.4 3.7 3.3 1.4 1.1 
Eastern Europe 11.8 13.5 16.1 9.7 11.9 12.6 20.3 10.4 
North America 5.3 6.4 7.7 6.4 8.2 7.4 7.7 1.4 
Latin America 0.5 7.9 10.7 17.7 4.7 6.4 9.8 9.5 
Asia -0.4 8.2 14.3 5.2 11.0 21.5 12.0 7.2 
Africa & M.E. 11.8 13.0 12.8 12.0 0.0 1.1 -3.4 8.1 
Oceania -- 3.2 -- -- -7.7 13.0 -- -- 
 High-tech Services 
Parent 11.3 7.6 4.6 7.9 9.9 8.7 1.7 12.5 
 
Subsidiaries 7.1 10.1 8.7 9.6 9.0 10.2 6.9 9.0 
Of which in  
EU 15 6.4 9.3 6.9 8.3 7.6 9.6 6.2 9.8 
Other Europe 1.0 4.6 4.1 5.0 8.9 8.1 4.4 6.9 
Eastern Europe 15.0 16.8 16.1 16.6 15.1 16.1 11.1 11.7 
North America 11.2 9.0 9.0 7.7 5.7 11.0 8.2 4.3 
Latin America 3.0 8.2 12.5 7.0 6.9 7.1 17.8 6.9 
Asia 13.1 10.9 8.1 9.6 19.7 6.8 12.4 13.5 
Africa & M.E. 16.6 10.6 37.6 7.6 -- 1.3 24.5 -1.1 
Oceania 3.7 10.5 -- 3.4 -- 1.1 -16.6 0.4 
Note: Some parent firm do not have a presence in certain regions or subsidiaries with observation of only 1 year, thus --. 
Source: Authors’ calculation using the Orbis data 
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Table 6  Probit estimation 
 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are contemporaneous. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Full sets of industry, time dummies (and country dummies for full sample) are included. 
 
 
Table 7  Sector specific probit estimates 
 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are lagged one period. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Full sets of industry, time dummies (and country dummies for full sample) are included. 
 Full 
sample 
Belgium France Germany Netherla
nds 
Sweden UK Japan US 
Size 0.03*** (0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.03) 
0.32*** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.29*** 
(0.04) 
0.30*** 
(0.06) 
Labour 
productivity 
0.14*** 
(0.01) 
0.40*** 
(0.03) 
0.44*** 
(0.02) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.34*** 
(0.04) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.58*** 
(0.05) 
0.37*** 
(0.07) 
Capital intensity 0.03*** (0.01) 
0.28*** 
(0.02) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.25*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.03) 
0.10*** 
(0.04) 
Profitability 0.14*** (0.01) 
0.04* 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Cash 0.10*** (0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.28*** 
(0.03) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
Constant -3.15*** (0.04) 
-3.07*** 
(0.14) 
-4.10*** 
(0.09) 
-1.22 
(0.29) 
-3.63*** 
(0.23) 
-2.48*** 
(0.13) 
-2.46*** 
(0.14) 
-8.09*** 
(32.14) 
-5.40*** 
(0.44) 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.19 0.31 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.44 0.23 
Log likelihood -26,481 -2,292 -6,694 -803 -1,069 2,936 -3,001 -1,718 -368 
Observations 62,229 4,507 20,789 1,291 1959 5,783 5,195 21,310 1,395 
 Full sample Manufacturing 
 
Services 
  Spec 1 Spec 2  Spec 1 Spec 2  Spec 1 Spec 2 
Size 0.28*** (22.95) 
0.29*** 
(21.16) 
0.41*** 
(23.16) 
0.42*** 
(21.95) 
0.15*** 
(8.34) 
0.13*** 
(6.58) 
Labour 
productivity 
0.44*** 
(24.9) 
0.43*** 
(20.00) 
0.50*** 
(19.24) 
0.46*** 
(15.18) 
0.33*** 
(13.81) 
0.33*** 
(10.74) 
Capital intensity 0.23*** (27.83) 
0.23*** 
(25.32) 
0.18*** 
(13.74) 
0.18*** 
(12.71) 
0.26*** 
(23.75) 
0.27*** 
(21.57) 
Profitability 0.06*** (6.53) 
0.06*** 
(5.37) 
0.04*** 
(2.98) 
0.03* 
(1.93) 
0.09*** 
(6.19) 
0.10*** 
(5.95) 
Cash 0.04*** (7.46) 
0.04*** 
(7.42) 
0.04*** 
(5.73) 
0.04*** 
(5.55) 
0.04*** 
(4.88) 
0.05*** 
(4.84) 
Average wage  0.09*** (2.80) 
 0.11*** 
(2.68) 
 0.12** 
(2.21) 
Constant -5.53*** (42.71) 
-4.91*** 
(-29.95) 
-5.26*** 
(26.82) 
-5.45*** 
(25.57) 
-3.97*** 
(21.22) 
-4.23*** 
(16.19) 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.3962 0.3656 0.4339 0.3887 0.3328 0.2966 
Log likelihood -3034 -7634 -4768 -4192 -4141 -3340 
Observations 25652 19177 13145 10112 12507 9065 
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Appendix A: 
Table A2  Country by Country Classification 
High Income 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Greece 
Greenland 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Spain 
Malta 
Monaco 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Switzerland 
Japan 
Germany 
Low Income 
Estonia 
Czech Republic 
Hong Kong, China 
Korea, Rep. 
Kuwait 
Macao, China 
Taiwan, China 
United Arab Emirates 
Puerto Rico 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
Slovenia 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Serbia 
Slovak Republic 
South Africa 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
Ukraine 
Argentina 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
India 
Kenya 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao PDR 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mongolia 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Rwanda 
São Tomé and Principe 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Hungary 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Chile 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Yemen, Rep. 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
China 
Colombia 
Sri Lanka 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Thailand 
Tonga 
Tunisia 
Turkmenistan 
Bulgaria 
Congo, Rep. 
Cuba 
Djibouti 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Fiji 
Georgia 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Iraq 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Macedonia, FYR 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Nicaragua 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Samoa 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Panama 
Poland 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Montenegro 
Oman 
Brazil 
Tax havens 
Antigua 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bermuda 
Channel Islands 
Cyprus 
Gibraltar 
Grenada 
Isle of Man 
Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
Macao 
Netherlands Antilles 
St Kitts and Nevis 
St Lucia 
St Vincent 
Turks and Caicos –
Islands 
Source: Harrison and McMillan (2007); Simpson (2007) 
 
